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Abstract. The paper tries to demonstrate that the debate about cultural diversity can-
not avoid issues concerning the historical nature of the European nation-state, the 
transformations provoked by the creation of the European Union, and the relationship 
between the nation state and democracy. The European historical specificities mark the 
forms multiculturalism can take. The paper tries as well to show how multiculturalism 
policies vary according to the contexts. In a comparative perspective, the paper con-
siders the development of multiculturalism outside Europe, looking in the first place 
at the Canadian experience, Canada being a pioneer in making of multiculturalism an 
official policy; then at the Latin American experiences of multiculturalism and of “mul-
tinationalism” (Barabas, 2015). In order to clarify how multiculturalism (and multina-
tionalism) was implemented in Latin America, the paper briefly discusses the historical 
formation of the Latin American states. It finally considers how a comparative Europe/
Latin America perspective can be useful to clarify the European dilemmas.
Keywords. Canada, cultural diversity, democracy, Europe, Latin America, Multicul-
turalism, Multinationalism, National State.
Abstract. Il saggio cerca di dimostrare che il dibattito sulla diversità culturale non 
può non affrontare questioni relative la natura storica dello Stato-nazione in Euro-
pa, le trasformazioni provocate dalla creazione dell’Unione europea, e il rapporto tra 
stato-nazione e democrazia. Le specificità storiche europee influenza le forme che il 
multiculturalismo può assumere. Il saggio cerca di mostrare così come le politiche di 
multiculturalismo variano a seconda dei contesti. In una prospettiva comparativa, esso 
considera lo sviluppo del multiculturalismo al di fuori dell’Europa, guardando in pri-
mo luogo alla esperienza canadese, essendo il Canada pioniere nel fare del multicultu-
ralismo la politica ufficiale dello stato; esso analizza inoltre le esperienze latino-ame-
ricane di multiculturalismo e di “multinazionalismo” (Barabas, 2015). Al fine di chia-
rire come il multiculturalismo (e il multinazionalismo) è stato realizzato in America 
Latina, il testo analizza brevemente la formazione storica degli stati latino-americani 
e infine, considera come la prospettiva comparativa tra Europa/America Latina può 
risultare utile per chiarire i dilemmi europei.
Keywords. America Latina, Canada, democrazia, diversità culturale, Europa, multi-
culturalismo, multinazionalismo, Stato nazionale.
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1. Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, the European political landscape has been characterized 
by the growth of parties placing themselves outside the two mainstream blocs that have 
dominated the agenda since World War 2: the conservatives and the social democrats. 
Following the work of the French scholar Pierre André Taguieff (1984, 2002), political sci-
entists define “new” parties – whose roots can be recent, but also ancient – as “populists” 
or “national-populists”: the Front National in France, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk 
Folkeparti), the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, abbreviated 
to FPÖ), the True Finns (Timo Soini), and the UKIP in the UK are classified under this 
umbrella1. 
Their common features have to do with the governance of cultural diversity (sub-
ject of the GOVDIV project’s topic): all these parties are hostile towards immigration; 
they reject multiculturalism2 as a political project; they support assimilation policies 
for migrants and are in favour of excluding non-nationals from a few some rights and 
provisions.“Priority to nationals” is one of their slogans (Mény, Surel, 2002). The“Populist” 
model of the nation-state is a culturally, and possibly ethnically, homogeneous entity 
(Canovan, 1981, Betz, 1994).
However, if we look in depth at the ways how most European states deal with immi-
grants’ integration - we realize that the borders between “populists” and mainstream par-
ties may be blurred. Just to give a few examples: in 2007, the conservative French Presi-
dent Sarkozy transformed the Ministry of Immigration into “Ministry of national iden-
tity”; in February 2011, UK prime Minister David Cameron strongly attacked “state multi-
culturalism”, accusing it of producing the insularity of Muslim communities that can foster 
terrorism3; in October 2012, German Chancelor Angela Merkel spoke about the failure of 
multiculturalism at a meeting of young members of her Christian Democratic Party in 
Potsdam (“This [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed,”)4. The recent massive 
arrivals of asylum-seekers from a troubled Middle East has shown how European coun-
tries have difficulty accepting diverse populations – in spite of an international legislation 
that should – theoretically – assure protection of victims of wars and violence. 
1 Outside academia, mainstream press and mainstream politicians often use the term “populists” both to define 
and to insult their adversaries. 
2 The term multiculturalism has multiple meanings: it is sometimes used just as a synonym of the term “cultural 
pluralism” of anthropological tradition (Barabas, 2015). In this article the term multiculturalism refers to the 
political experience of the Canadian state and to the policies that have been introduced in Europe on the basis of 
the “multiculturalist ideology” – that is, according to the definition of Vertovec (2003) “recognizing the rights of 
cultural diversity and the formation of new communities, abandoning the principle of homogeneous and mono-
cultural nation-states, and linking these rights with social equality and anti-discrimination.”
3 “Britain, the prime minister said, has “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives” with the effect of 
“weakening our collective identity”. This has contributed to a disorientation among young Muslims that makes 
them susceptible to extremist preachers. The antidote, according to Mr Cameron, is a more consistent, robust 
promotion of liberal-democratic values – human rights, religious tolerance, gender equality – and a greater 
emphasis on shared British cultural attributes. He calls it “active, muscular liberalism.” (Editorial The Observer, 
Sunday 6 February 2011).
4 Matthew Weaver, Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has “utterly failed”. The Chancellor’s assertion that 
onus is on new arrivals to do more to integrate into German society stirs anti-immigration debate, Guardian, 17 
October 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed> 
(09/2016).
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The wind of “neo-nationalism” that is blowing over Europe (Petrie, Maryniak, 1997, 
Chatignoux, 2013, Cerretelli, 2014) targets, first of all, immigrants and, secondly, multi-
culturalism, as a political approach to deal with societies’ diversity.In the third place, it 
affects the European Union’s project of a stronger integration among European countries. 
Today nobody can bet that the fate of European countries will be an irreversible dissolu-
tion into the supra-national construction of the European Union, which was presented by 
the mainstream politicians as one of the few macro-entities (United States, China, Euro-
pean Union) able to face the challenges of an increasingly globalized world5.
Since a few years, the dilemmas about giving up more state sovereignty to the EU 
supranational entity (as it was the case in the construction the monetary Union through 
the euro) concern both a large number of European political parties (not necessarily “pop-
ulist”), and the wide range of European public opinions from North to South, from West 
to East (Lordon, 2014). 
The reasons for this trend are not trivial. In the 2008 economic crisis, the EU and 
especially the Eurozone – as a monetary union deprived of the political institutions that 
could make it work – have shown numerous dysfunctional aspects6: choice of econom-
ic austerity policies that produce unemployment; lack of solidarity among states; lack of 
coordination in international politics and in front of major problems (such as the refugee 
crisis) – the list could be long... (Lordon, 2014). Consequently, the issue of sovereignty has 
appeared as a crucial one. Is the EU legitimized to impose economic policies against the 
vote of the citizens, as it was the case in Greece with the victory of Syriza?
Both issues – migration/integration policies and sovereignty – bring the European 
nation state and its future to the core of the political debate (Canovan 2000, 2002).The 
two issues produce, however, different social and political outcomes. Assimilationism 
and identity policies, defended by national-populists as well as by a part of the main-
stream parties, risk fueling xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism among populations 
that are rendered unsafe by an economic crisis without an end in sight. On the con-
trary, the issue of sovereignty produces an interesting debate on the conditions allow-
ing democracy to work (and on the risk of entering a “post-democratic phase”) and 
demands for a democratic regeneration, both at national and European level. A new 
“left” embraces this position – namely the radical or alternative parties, such as Syriza 
in Greece or Podemos in Spain, that aim to replace the old social democratic parties of 
the centre-left. These forces are erroneously called “populists” - just because they refuse 
the TINA slogan (there is no alternative) of the neo-liberal thought and of the pro-
Europeans who deny the failure of the present EU construction. They also look at non-
European experiences, namely Latin American ones for a renovation of the relationship 
between the state, the nation and the “people”.
The paper tries to demonstrate that the debate about cultural diversity cannot avoid 
issues concerning the historical nature of the European nation-state, the transformations 
provoked by the creation of the European Union, and the relationship between the nation 
state and democracy. The European historical specificities mark the forms multicultural-
5 See, for example Wolfgang Munchau, Europe’s multiplicity of crises is not accidental – «Financial Times», 4th 
of January 2016, p. 6.
6 “If you create a monetary union without shared economic institutions, fiscal policies and legal systems, you are 
bound to hit a wall eventually.” (Munchau, 2016, p. 6)
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ism can take. The paper tries as well to show how multiculturalism policies vary according 
to the contexts. 
In a comparative perspective, the paper considers the development of multicultural-
ism outside Europe, looking in the first place at the Canadian experience, Canada being 
a pioneer in making of multiculturalism an official policy; then at the Latin American 
experiences of multiculturalism and of “multinationalism” (Barabas, 2015). In order to 
clarify how multiculturalism (and multinationalism) was implemented in Latin America, 
the paper briefly discusses the historical formation of the Latin American states. It finally 
considers how a comparative Europe/Latin America perspective can be useful to clarify 
the European dilemmas.
2. The historical development of imperialist aggressive nationalism during the Nine-
teenth century
Without going into details, let’s consider some highlights in the history of European 
nation states and of European nationalism. As Martinelli – among others – points out, the 
European nation state – “the main institutional innovation of the modern European society, 
together with market capitalism and research university”7 – is a relatively recent outcome, 
following the fall of the “Ancien Régime” and linked to the “formation of the industrial 
economy, mass society and expansion of cultural communication”8. (Martinelli, 2013, p. 16)
The ideology that is behind the nation-state is nationalism, a term used for the first time by the 
French Abbot Barruel in 1798 in a negative way (he criticized the hostility of the Jacobins towards 
strangers) and, the same year, by the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (Nationalismus) 
in a positive way, with reference to nationality, patriotism and “Volk” – “the people”, defined as an 
organic homogenous individuality, with its unique specific characteristics. The Herderian concept 
of the nation, as a classless, but hierarchical national body, requires its members to have a common 
identity and common standards of conduct, while excluding “outsiders”. (Blokker, 2005, p. 382)
Following the two quoted approaches, the nationalist ideology developed around 
two different visions of the relationship between the people and the nation: the people, 
as”demos”, is held together by citizenship, implemented through constitution, political 
institutions and active participation; the people, as “ethnos”, is identified through culture, 
language and/or blood. Even if the history of each European nation state presents spe-
cific characters, we can argue that during the XIXth century the idea of people as”ethnos” 
prevailed in most European countries, from Germany (where the Herderian principle was 
dominant) to Italy, from Poland to Spain. This idea produced a mythological narrative 
about the original habitants of the territory of the nation states, from whom the present 
citizens were the descendants. 
Moreover, during the Nineteenth century, the ideas supporting the nation as an 
organic individuality and the people as “ethnos” were reinforced by the broad accept-
7 «la principale innovazione istituzionale della società europea moderna, accanto al capitalismo di mercato e 
all’università di ricerca».
8 «alla formazione dell’economia industriale, della società di massa, e all’espansione della comunicazione cul-
turale».
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ance of racist theories. According to the historian Eric Hobsbawm (1992), there are obvi-
ous links between racism and nationalism: they have reinforced each other in the transi-
tion from the “liberal” nationalism – fighting for Constitutionalism and independence of 
nations as Italy, Poland, Finland in the first half of the century – towards the aggressive 
and imperialist nationalism, tied to colonial expansionism in the second half of century. 
Hobsbawn notices that, since 1870, in Europe, ethnicity and language became the central, 
when not the only, criteria to legitimize a nation and that the nationalism and patriotism 
slipped politically towards the “right”9.
Benedict Anderson (1996) identifies the turning point in the period from 1870 to 
1914, which coincides with the phase of imperialism (particularly German imperialism in 
conflict with the British one): nationalism – combined with imperialist and racist ideas – 
led to tragedy; World War 1 and 2 were the outcomes. The relationship between national-
ism and the structure of the state changed: while in the first half of the Nineteenth centu-
ry, liberal ideas were dominating the national movements, in the second half of the nine-
teenth century and in the first half of the twentieth, nationalism became a component of 
authoritarian regimes, then of absolutism / dictatorship / totalitarianism. The worst mani-
festations of “totalitarian” nationalism are fascism and Nazism.
3. Overcoming European nationalism: Altiero Spinelli and Winston Churchill for the 
United States of Europe
The phases of European nationalism are clearly described by the Italian political 
thinkers and activists – Altiero Spinelli and Emesto Rossi – in the 1943 “Ventotene Man-
ifesto”, written when they were both interned by fascist regime on the island of Vento-
tene10. The manifesto promotes the idea of the United States of Europe as the only possi-
ble answer to European nationalism:
The ideology of national independence was a powerful stimulus to progress. It helped overcome 
narrow-minded parochialism and created a much wider feeling of solidarity against foreign oppres-
sion. It eliminated many obstacles hindering the free movement of people and goods. Within the ter-
ritory of each new State, it brought the institutions and systems of the more advanced societies to 
more backward ones. But with this ideology came the seeds of capitalist imperialism, which our own 
generation has seen to flourish to a point where totalitarian States have grown up and world wars 
have been unleashed. Thus the nation is no longer viewed as the historical product of co-existence 
between men who, as the result of a lengthy historical process, have acquired greater unity in their 
customs and aspirations and who see their State as being the most effective means of organizing col-
lective life within the context of all human society. Rather the nation has become a divine entity, an 
organism that must only consider its own existence, its own development, without the least regard 
for the damage that others may suffer from this. The absolute sovereignty of national States has led to 
9 The connection between racism and nationalism is illustrated by the confusion between the notions of nation, 
race, language and religion: eg anti-Semitism acquires its racial character only in 1880, whereas previously it was 
mostly of a religious nature; race and nation are used as “almost synonyms”, also in function of a certain idea of 
inheritance. Hobsbawn (1992) states that the possible reasons for these important changes are manifold; especially 
the context of wars (colonial, between France and Prussia) and the economic crisis of the second industrialization. 
The historian does not find surprising that nationalism has “rapidly gained ground between 1870 and 1914.
10 After being distributed in mimeographed form, a clandestine edition of the Manifesto appeared in Rome in 
January 1944, a few months before the liberation of the town.
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the desire of each of them to dominate, since each feels threatened by the strength of the others, and 
considers that its “living space” should include increasingly vast territories that give it the right to free 
movement and provide self-sustenance without needing to rely on others. This desire to dominate 
cannot be placated except by the hegemony of the strongest State over all the others.11
In response to the tragedy of World War 2, caused by nationalism, Spinelli and Ros-
si propose to abolish the division of Europe into national, sovereign states and to create 
a federal Europe. They follow, in this respect, the thought of another Italian, Giuseppe 
Mazzini12, who was an early advocate of a “United States of Europe”, and regarded Euro-
pean unification as a logical continuation of the Unification of Italy.
The idea of the United States of Europe, in the frame of the United Nations and under 
the patronage of Great Britain and the United States, in order to overcome German (and 
French) nationalism, is expressed by Winston Churchill in a speech given in Zurich in 1946:
I must now sum up the propositions which are before you. Our constant aim must be to build and 
fortify the strength of the United Nations Organisation. Under and within that world concept, we 
must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of 
Europe. The first step is to form Council of Europe. If at first all the States of Europe are not willing 
or able to join the Union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will 
and those who can. The salvation of the common people of every race and of every land from war 
or servitude must be established on solid foundations and must be guarded by the readiness of all 
men and women to die rather than submit to tyranny. In all this urgent work, France and Germany 
must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, 
and I trust Soviet Russia - for then indeed all would be well - must be the friends and sponsors of 
the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.13
4. Towards the European Union
In 1950, Robert Schuman, at the time France’s Foreign Minister, launches a European 
organisation that would be responsible for pooling the French and German production of 
coal and steel:
11 <http://www.federalists.eu/uef/library/books/the-ventotene-manifesto/> (09/2016).
12 Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was an Italian politician, journalist and activist for the unification of Italy. His 
efforts helped bring about the independent and unified Italy in place of the several separate states, many dominat-
ed by foreign powers that existed until the 19th century. He is considered an early advocate of the “United States 
of Europe”: “In the Spring of 1834, while at Bern, Mazzini and a dozen refugees from Italy, Poland and Germany 
founded a new association with the grandiose name of Young Europe. Its basic, and equally grandiose idea, was 
that, as the French Revolution of 1789 had enlarged the concept of individual liberty, another revolution would 
now be needed for national liberty; and his vision went further because he hoped that in the no doubt distant 
future free nations might combine to form a loosely federal Europe with some kind of federal assembly to regu-
late their common interests. [...] His intention was nothing less than to overturn the European settlement agreed 
in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna, which had reestablished an oppressive hegemony of a few great powers and 
blocked the emergence of smaller nations. [...] Mazzini hoped, but without much confidence, that his vision of a 
league or society of independent nations would be realized in his own lifetime. In practice Young Europe lacked 
the money and popular support for more than a short-term existence. Nevertheless he always remained faithful 
to the ideal of a united continent for which the creation of individual nations would be an indispensable prelimi-
nary” (Mack Smith, 1994, 11-12); Mack Smith, D. (1994), Mazzini, Yale University Press, Yale, pp. 11–12.
13 <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html> (09/2016).
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The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable 
to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of 
champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A 
united Europe was not achieved and we had war. 
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
institutions, which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe 
requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in 
the first place concern these two countries.
With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one 
limited but decisive point:
It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a com-
mon High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other 
countries of Europe.14
The design of the unification of Europe started by Schuman continues slowly over the 
following years, focusing mainly on the economic aspects of the partnership. The idea of 
abandoning political sovereignty for a supra-national entity wasn’t acceptable neither by 
the political parties nor by the peoples – still traumatized by the German occupation of 
large parts of Europe. It is only thirty-six years later, in 1986, that the Single European Act 
announced the political aim of a “European Union”; it is only after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 that concrete steps towards the construction of a supra-national Europe were taken.
The fall of the Berlin Wall was greeted with joy, but was also looked at with fear. Giv-
en the past history of Germany, the will of the German government to accomplish the 
reunification raised worries. We can find interesting information about the reactions of 
French President François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher in the Documents on British 
Foreign Policy: German Unification, 1989-90 (ed. Patrick Salmon et al, 2010)15.The risk of 
having again a too powerful Germany in Europe needed to be avoided through a rein-
forcement of the European institutions. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, with the objective of 
setting up federal structures, and the introduction of the euro (2001) were the answer to 
this fear: they still are the highlights of the political project of the European Union. 
Done in a hurry, under the pressure of the German will to re-unify the country, the 
creation of a supra-national federal state lacked political, cultural and even ideological 
basis: what was Europe going to be? A set of civic values? Or a model analogous to the old 
nation state, based on homogenous characteristics, such as cultural or even ethnic crite-
ria16? Nobody knew…
Maastricht Treaty was the expression of a political will that did not take into account 
the historical, cultural and economic differences existing among the European nation 
states, in particular their inability – because of a history of nationalism – to deal with 
cultural diversity, even inside their borders: while the European leaders were signing the 
Maastricht Treaty, many territorial minorities were still fighting for recognition of their 
specificities, their language, for gaining more autonomy, etc. – Corsicans in France, 
Basques and Catalans in Spain, Scots in the UK...
14 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9-may-1950> (09/2016).
15 <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/113883> (09/2016).
16 Second, the individual nation states have never accepted to abandon their cultural specificity (educational sys-
tems have never depended by the European Union, unlike the currency).
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The way in which the European countries were dealing with migration was another 
indicator of the problems raised by cultural diversity. Each European country followed its 
own approach for integrating old and new migrants. The French Republican model, theo-
retically based on universalistic ideals, was de facto assimilation; even worse, it was unable 
to prevent racism, discrimination and ghettoization, as the movement of the second gen-
eration of Maghrebian origin (Les Beurs) denounced in their demonstrations. Germany 
still refused to be considered an immigration country, after having invented the expres-
sion Gastarbeiter (guest-workers).Something was, however, changing: Great Britain was 
open to the novelties coming from the USA and Canada, where the ideology of multi-
culturalism – a product of an American movement of the Sixties, the “ethnic revival”, was 
implemented in concrete policies.
5. European Democratic Nationalism after World War II
The fact that, in the early Nineties, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, European 
countries were embedded in great difficulties in dealing with cultural diversity does not 
mean that they had still something in common with the extreme nationalist, racist and 
colonialist nation states of the Thirties. World War II had marked the end of the aggres-
sive and imperialist nationalism that had dominated the European nation states between 
the end of the Nineteenth century and 1945. A new type of nationalism appeared – deeply 
democratic and moderate.
Differently from fascism, nationalism was not rejected after World War 2. The Resist-
ance against Nazism and German occupation was inspired in many countries by nation-
alist ideals – recovering the liberal nationalism of the early Nineteenth century – the 
“freedom nationalism”. Only extreme “ethnic” nationalism, as an essential component of 
fascism and Nazism, was rejected; moderate nationalism was perfectly adapted to liberal 
democracy and social democracy, in spite of the universalistic approach of the socialist 
ideology. 
Nationalist ideology, even if in a moderate form, continued to be consciously culti-
vated by the institutions (such as the national army and the school) and rites (national 
holidays, ceremonies and events)17, but it was combined with the ideas of democracy and 
social justice under the pressure of the political forces that had fought against Nazi Ger-
many and fascist Italy. 
After World War II, at least in Western Europe, the forces that had defeated Nazi 
Germany built democratic governments based on the double principles of freedom and 
social justice. The principle of freedom is based on sovereignty, which is the foundation 
of democracy. It is the sovereignty that founds the political community – what is called 
the “people” and defines a political order in the space of the nation. Until now, no alter-
native form to give citizens freedom and democracy has been implemented outside the 
nation: the EU badly lacks democratic legitimation – the institutions that compose it are 
not elected and not submitted to the control of the people. (Rovira Kaltwasser C. 2012).
17 Finally, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the end of animosity among the European nation states after World War 
2 was also a consequence of the Cold War: the Soviet Union threat pushed all the Western European countries 
inside the NATO alliance.
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As the French philosopher Alain Finkelkraut (2014) reminded in a debate with Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit:
The nation: the space in which what happens the others happens to you. Despite the ‘telepresence’ in 
the world, no one can overthrow the power of the boundaries. It is in this circumscribed space that 
democracy makes sense.18
The boundary between nation/sovereignty/democracy was inscribed in the Constitu-
tions that were a product of the Resistance against Nazism and Fascism. The post-World 
War II European nation state was in its nature democratic – rejecting any form of authori-
tarian and dictatorial regime. 
Besides democracy, the victory on Nazism and Fascism engendered another “child” 
bound to change deeply the nature of the European nation state, namely the welfare state. 
In the post-war nation state, the political citizenship – the possibility to elect their repre-
sentatives and to be elected – was coupled with the social citizenship, through the intro-
duction of the welfare state.
6. A new role for the nation state: the welfare state
The idea of the welfare state was developed by William Beveridge (1942-1945) in the 
UK during the war and was adopted by most European countries in the post-war period.It 
represents a new pact between state and citizens; the new post-war national state is at the 
same time the guarantor of democracy and of the well being of the citizens.
According to William Beveridge, the state must fulfil three specific tasks. The first is to 
introduce a unified social security system, mandatory for all citizens, able to cover catas-
trophes or loss of capacity. The second involves the organization of a coherent and articu-
lated system of health services that is free and open to everyone, even designed with a view 
to monitoring and preventing diseases. The third concerns the basis of the welfare state, 
namely full employment, understood as an essential requirement to be put in place. Full 
employment is the alpha and omega of the economic policy of the post-war nation states.
Sandro Mezzadra (2002) recalls how William Beveridge proposed a new social con-
tract between the classes, based on the social rights of citizenship. In the years of War, 
William Beveridge, presiding at the time the Interministery Committee for Social Insur-
ance, established by the National Government of Winston Churchill, believed that the war 
could not be won unless millions of ordinary people in Britain would be convinced that 
we had to offer something better than the enemy, not only during but also after the war. 
This belief was expressed in a report published by Beveridge in December 1942, entitled 
Social Insurances and Allied Services. This report, considered by many historians close to 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, represents the real birth of a democratic welfare state, marked by a 
universalist logic and compatible with a market economy. It was explicitly formulated to 
take advantage of the relative levelling of social conditions, produced by the war (the so-
called spirit of Dunkirk19) to launch a set of social protections.
18 <http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/01/europe-ce-qui-oppose-daniel-cohn-bendit-et-alain-
finkielkraut_4358142_3232.html> (09/2016).
19 The phrase came into use following the evacuation of allied troops across the English Channel by flotillas of 
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The question of the welfare is extremely important, in order to understand the present 
rejection of the European Union by large groups of the population: the monetary union – with 
its rules concerning the limits of government debt - is perceived (and as a matter of fact is) a 
threat to the welfare system. It is not by chance that the Swedish people, strongly in favour of 
the welfare state, voted against joining the euro! The perception of the state as protector is in 
fact a legacy of the post-war nation state. It must also be stressed that the provision of welfare 
was perceived as bound to the national citizenship, foreigners being excluded20. 
In the absence of a European system of social protection, the austerity policies 
imposed by the EU destroy the welfare system that still depends on states that are forced 
to cut the provisions in order to follow the budget rules established by the governance of 
the euro. This means the end of the type of nation state that was built after World War II. 
Moreover, the competition for the small bribes of the welfare that are left after the 
introduction of the austerity policies, is a cause of growing racism and xenophobia against 
the immigrants by the European populations that have never been prepared to policies 
of multiculturalism and to the idea of recognition of the others as part of the nation, the 
welfare being mainly reserved to the nationals. 
7. A new model to deal with diversity: multiculturalism as official Canadian policy
During the Sixties, in the USA, the ethnic revival – the request for recognition by the 
second and third generation of immigrants - produced the ideology of multiculturalism as 
“recognizing the rights of cultural diversity and the formation of new communities, aban-
doning the principle of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states, and linking these 
rights with social equality and anti-discrimination.” Multiculturalism ideology found its 
most interesting implementation in Canada, becoming the political-cultural project of a 
country that had been marked by multiple ethnic tensions.
During the Seventies, the conflict between French-speaking and English-speaking 
people was likely to lead to the independence of Quebec, threatening the unity of the 
country. American Indians (or better, “first nations”) were in revolt, especially in Que-
bec. Immigrants no longer accepted to be subordinated to the two “founding peoples”, 
the French and the English.As a response, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invented a new 
model for staying together, based on the value of diversity and equal rights. In 1971, Can-
ada was the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy and 
a new narrative. “By so doing, Canada affirmed the value and dignity of all Canadian citi-
zens regardless of their racial or ethnic origins, their language, or their religious affiliation. 
The 1971 Canadian policy of multiculturalism also confirmed the rights of aboriginal peo-
ples and the status of Canada’s two official languages.” 
pleasure boats, working barges and other civilian craft at the Battle of Dunkirk in 1940. The spirit of Dunkirk is 
the spirit of the British public pulling together to overcome times of adversity.
20 The crisis of the welfare is, as a matter of fact, a result of neo-liberalism, as Canclini points out: “Es impor-
tante nombrar el liberalismo como el modo de organización y desorganización económica que ha favorecido 
esta precariedad. Pero también hay una desresponsabilización de los Estados en cuanto a seguridades sociales, 
médicas y otras garantías básicas de la vida.”- Interview with Nestor García Canclini: “El papa es complejo y 
astuto”- «El País», 31st May 2015, <http://cultura.elpais.com/cultura/2015/05/29/actualidad/1432901289_103752.
html> (09/2016).
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Canada thus offered the world the model of a new type of federal state, praising the 
value the diversity and refusing to define an official culture. Abandoning the relationship 
between language and culture, Canada broke with a pillar of the European nationalist ide-
ology (Kymlicka, 1999).
For a short time, during the Nineties, a period when the European Union knew an 
optimistic expansion (enlargement towards the East and introduction of the euro), some 
scholars working on multiculturalism and intercultural approaches hoped that the Euro-
pean Union would assume the Canadian model in order to hold together its multiple 
differences: European nation states, minorities and new immigration. But this perspec-
tive failed. Each nation state continued to follow its own politics in the matter of migra-
tion and cultural diversity, while problems increased with the settlement and the growing 
arrival of non-Europeans, especially from Muslim countries.
8. The failure of European cultural diversity and integration policies
In France, multiculturalism was rejected in name of the “republican model” (a form 
of assimilation): the ghost of “communitarianism” was considered the main enemy of inte-
gration. The sad conditions of the immigrant areas in certain suburbs (“les banlieues”), 
ghettos of poverty and unemployment, demonstrate how this approach was wrong.
Germany finally accepted the fact of being an immigration country, but without 
accepting multiculturalism. The weak equilibrium with respect to immigrants that seems 
to exist in this country is assured by a good economic situation: but it should not be for-
gotten that immigrants in Germany have always lived in the midst of racist and even neo-
Nazi groups.
Rejected in France and in Germany, a European version of multiculturalism was actu-
ally followed by the UK and by Norway and Sweden. In spite of all the difficulties, these 
are the countries where the integration processes for migrants had the best results.
Other countries, such as Belgium, developed a sort of pretended “multiculturalist” 
tolerance. The tragic events of the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels show how, in the 
absence of economic possibilities of building a decent life and of an in-depth change in 
the narrative of the nation, this pseudo-multiculturalism can only create separate worlds. 
This superficial idea of multiculturalism, of which Belgium is a tragic example, misses 
completely two dimensions that have represented the success of the USA and Canadian 
experiences: some forms of affirmative action to help minorities and avoid ghettoization, 
and the political, cultural and ideological recognition of minorities and migrants as essen-
tial parts of the construction of a new nation (as is the case in Canada and also in the 
USA as the election of a black American president shows). 
It is interesting to note that today, when European countries shut the doors for ref-
ugees, Canada has a completely different policy. In an article, titled “Réfugiés: exception 
canadienne” published by Le Monde, dated 26.03.2016, Sylvie Kauffmann writes:
The Liberal government of Canada plans on welcoming up to 305,000 new permanent residents this 
year — the highest projected immigration level in decades, and around a seven per cent increase 
above the 2015 plan. The government provided details in its 2016 Immigration Levels Plan, which 
was published on Tuesday, March 8. The increase in immigration numbers will be primarily through 
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family sponsorship and refugee settlement programs, though more than half of all newcomers will 
arrive through economic immigration programs.21
The numbers of refugees to be accepted in 2016 will be around double the number 
that was targeted for 2015. Canada’s Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
(IRCC, formerly known as CIC), John McCallum, has stated that his department aims to 
speed up processing times for family class immigration, economic immigrants and refu-
gee claimants by applying the lessons it learned from bringing 25,000 Syrian refugees to 
Canada over recent months”22.
Moreover, the new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, son of Pierre Trudeau (of the Lib-
eral Party like his father) breaks the dogma of austerity, is developing a recovery program 
through public investment in infrastructure and green technology, abolishes the forfeiture 
of citizenship for bi-national terrorists, and increases the budget of the immigration service.
The Canadian example should be followed by the European states even for dealing 
with territorial minorities. The continuous tensions between the Spanish government and 
the autonomous province of Catalonia about the right to hold a referendum on independ-
ence show how European countries are unable to follow the model of Canada where two, 
not just one, referendums for the independence of Québec were organized in a democratic 
way (and lost by the parties in favour of independence). 
To conclude, the democratisation of the European nation states after World War II 
hasn’t solvedthedifficulties in dealing with internal minorities and with immigrants that 
nationalism had produced. The creation of the European Union has by no way signified a 
positive shift towards a different model of dealing with diversity. 
On the contrary, the European Union had a negative impact, because, having imposed 
austerity policies, it has contributed to destroying welfare, that was, with democracy, one 
of the most important achievements of the post-World War II era, and a re-legitimization 
of the nation state. 
The dismantling of the welfare state is also one of the main causes of the grow-
ing xenophobia and racism: when services are scarce, the competition with foreigners 
becomes stronger. We can see the reasons why many political forces and many citizens 
claim a return to full sovereignty – modifying the Maastricht Treaty and eventually aban-
doning the euro.Sovereignty means the possibility to do the policies that have been cho-
sen through democracy. Of course the return to sovereignty is part of the program of the 
national-populists, but it is also a request of progressive forces worried about the condi-
tions for democracy. These forces – as Podemos in Spain - refer to the “people”, in the 
sense that the political organization of the “people” is, indeed, democracy.
9. Multiculturalism and multinationalism in Latin America
The ideology of national independence was a powerful stimulus to progress. It helped overcome 
narrow-minded parochialism and created a much wider feeling of solidarity.
21 <http://www.lemonde. f r/ idees/ar t icle/2016/03/26/ l-except ion-canadienne_4890452_3232.
html#ezhF3ouuXYFwfbMQ.99> (09/2016).
22 Read more at <http://www.cicnews.com/2016/03/government-canada-plans-admitting-record-numbers-immi-
grants-2016-037396.html#xO2lmgrLMpf80FOu.99> (09/2016).
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This sentence written by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi in the Ventotene Mani-
festo is true for many countries not only in Europe, but also in other continents such as 
Latin America, where the independence from Spain and Portugal was obtained between 
1810 and 1830.
However, some specific characteristics show a significant difference in the construc-
tion of the nation states of Latin America. Among these differences, we will mention:
• the leadership, namely Simon Bolivar and José de San Martin were inspired by the 
ideas of the Enlightment more than by those of Romanticism23; 
• the dependence on foreign nations for obtaining capital and for economic investment 
– putting these countries in a “neo-colonial” dependence – even after the independ-
ence24; 
• a special role in causing this dependence was played by the “colossus of the North” 
(the USA); 
• the complex relationships with the natives (the Amerindians); 
• the importance of the European immigration in the second half of the Nineteenth 
century for the formation of nations such as Argentina or Brazil.
Differently from Europe, the mythical narrative based on a common “blood” as con-
sequence of a common origin (suggested by the French expression “de souche”) could 
not exist in countries where the only natives were the indigenous populations that had 
been subjugated by the Spanish or Portuguese settlers, and where the transational oligar-
chy identified with Europe or the USA. Hybridization processes had taken place - between 
Europeans and natives, and between Europeans and African slaves. Finally, in the XIXth 
century, massive European immigration transformed thoroughly the demographic pat-
terns of many Latin American countries such as Argentina or Brazil. 
In Latin America, the recognition of the mixture of cultures, of the processes of 
hybridisation, and of the phenomenon of transculturation has a very long history. For 
example, the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz in his book “Contrapunteo cubano del 
tabaco y el azúcar” published in 1940 first iterated the concept of transculturation, refer-
ring to the mixing of cultures that occurs when cultures interact with one another.
Ortiz built his concept in contrast to the North American version of cultural mix-
ing, called “acculturation”, which implies that a subordinate culture adopts the cultural 
references of a dominant culture, leaving out the kind of two-way interaction that Ortiz 
describes. 
23 The two leading figures that shaped the Latin American revolutionary movements during the wars of inde-
pendence, Simon Bolivar and José de San Martín echoed the American and the French Revolution and were 
inspired by the Enlightenment with its universalistic ideas. They were not influenced by Romanticism that 
fuelled the independence wars in Europe a few years later (as it was the case for the Italian war of Independ-
ence). By the way, Bolivar wanted to forge Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador (Gran Colombia) into a single 
nation. This project was a failure: by 1830, geographical factors, plus cultural differences defeated Bolivar’s other 
attempts to create a confederation of the former Spanish colonies failed.
24 The condition of dependence from foreign powers produced various phenomena that cannot be analysed here: 
the ruling classes tried to modernize the countries through generous concessions to foreign investors. This con-
tributed to create transnational oligarchies that were deeply divided from the lower classes. The role of the USA 
in the economic –but sometimes military- domination of the Latin American continent is huge.
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In Ortiz’s vision, cultural mixing occurs in multiple directions, with all cultures being 
affected and changed rather than merely the one being oppressed or dominated, generally an 
indigenous and/or disempowered population. Hybridisation and transculturation were how-
ever caused by colonisation and the imposition of European models, the indigenous popula-
tion being ignored and suppressed during the historical process that led to the formation of 
the Latin American countries. Without a doubt, its mixture of culture or “metissage” is an 
expression of Latin American identity, but it should be added that this does not mean that 
there are no “minority cultures”, with individual indigenous identities and minorities within 
them. These “minority cultures” have been suppressed over the centuries and are the ones 
that fight today for recognition and a specific form of multiculturalism (Barabas, 2015).
As the book of Alicia Barabas, Multiculturalismo e interculturalidad en America 
(2015), illustrates, things have changed in the last thirty years, with the reclamation of 
the rights of the Indigenous (or First) people, following the Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples Convention, 1989 (Convention No. 169) which entered into force the 5th of Sep-
tember 1991. Since then, multiculturalism25 is present in the reclamation of the rights of 
the indigenous people to be treated equally and to have the same cultural rights as “the 
majority”, namely the ruling elite26.
The request of recognition of the indigenous people in Latin America represents a 
specific form of multiculturalism, encompassing not only the notion of recognition of dif-
ference, but also that of redistribution of resources. In order to reach these aims, various 
new political movements and new leaders have appeared – among whom a special place 
has been taken by Evo Morales, who was elected president of Bolivia in 2006, the first 
indigenous president of a country where the majority is indigenous.
It must be stressed that each country of Latin America has developed a different form 
of multiculturalism, with respect to its context of cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity. 
In the case of Bolivia, after the election of 2006, the new Constitution gave much impor-
tance to structuring the new State as multicultural and multinational. The different ethnic 
and cultural identities have to be given the status of “nation” or “nationalities”. That’s why 
Bolivia must be defined as a multinational or plurinational state. Moreover, the plurina-
tional state in Evo Morales’ Bolivia has incorporated elements of the indigenous world-
view like sumac causay (good living) in Latin American political discourse.
10. Conclusions
The paper has shown that forms of nation states vary according to the period and the 
context; it has also argued that the European nation states are based on a specific ideology 
embedded in Romaticism that values cultural and ethnic homogeneity as a founding ele-
ment; this makes it especially difficult for the nation state to deal with cultural diversity – 
whether territorial minorities or immigrants. This difficulty has deep historical roots. 
The construction of the EU has been an attempt to overcome European nationalism, 
but it has destroyed the democratic basis of the post-war European nation-state, of which 
25 Together with its intercultural variant, mainly focusing the exchange between cultures.
26 Chipana C. G (2013), The Prisma: <http://theprisma.co.uk/2013/04/01/towards-latin-american-multicultural-
ism/> (09/2016).
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the welfare system was a founding component. Moreover, the relationships between the 
European citizens and the political institutions continue to develop at the national level.
Claiming back national sovereignity in front of the EU makes sense with respect to the 
exercise of democracy. 
The paper has also argued that we cannot talk about a single model of multicultural-
ism: its specific forms depend on the context. Multiculturalism does not mean the same in 
Canada, Bolivia, Great Britain, France or Germany. 
Multiculturalism develops best in countries where the existing cultural pluralism is 
accepted and considered as a value – as is the case in Canada. It cannot develop in a satis-
factory way if diversity is perceived as a threat. 
In their attempt of revitalizing democracy, some new political formations – especially 
the Spanish Podemos – look at “left-oriented” or progressive Latin American examples: 
the governments of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, Nestor and Cristina Kirch-
ner.Various forms of multiculturalism and interculturalism are introduced in these coun-
tries combined with a reinforcement of democracy and political participation of the citi-
zens. What is at stake is an idea of “the people” that is not grounded in cultural homoge-
neity or worse, ethnicity, but that at the same time is not reduced to a set of fragmented 
communities, as in a certain interpretations of multiculturalism. In the Latin American 
countries the scope of multiculturalism is not only the notion of recognition of differ-
ence, but also of redistribution of resources. In order to reach this aim, multiculturalism 
matches with an idea of “people” as a political community around a common political cul-
ture and a common project.That is what Evo Morales suggests: a multinational state, but a 
common Bolivian people, conscious of its rights. 
At a given moment in history the “people” holds a central position in the public 
discourse and creates a “political nation” of solidarity and dignity, overcoming the eth-
nic and cultural differences, bringing together the multitudes against an oligarchical 
and technocratic power. Looking at the Latin American examples, we can argue that 
focusing on “the people” is not populism, but an attempt to respond to democratic 
aspirations27.
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